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A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1) Did the trial court err in granting judgment to Mr. Gardiner where the records does not
support the elements of a fraudulent transfer as defined in U.C.A. 25-6-5
2) Did the trial Court err in ignoring There was ample evidence to support the conclusion
that there was a pre-existing debt from Interport Inc to Ms. York.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether
the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation;
and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur,
debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (1) (a), consideration may be given, among
other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
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(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the
assets to an insider of the debtor.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1) On roughly January 3 2001, the Plaintiff (Mr. Richard Gardiner) an attorney obtained a
default judgment against Interport Inc. in the General District Court of Fairfax County,
State of Virginia in the amount of $7,182.95.
2) A warrant in debt was mailed to the registered agent of Interport on or about August 5,
2000 which was delivered to that agent on or about 5 August 2000.
3) The warrant in debt was also served by private process server on the registered agent on
18 August 2000.
4) Mr. Gardiner filed to domesticate his foreign judgment in Utah in the Fourth District
Court of Utah County.
5) Notice of this filing was served on Interport on August 2 2001.
6) Interport attempted to resist the judgment by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
7) That motion was denied and the judgment was domesticated in Utah.
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8) Interport had transferred to title to a warehouse in Delta, Utah to Betty York for debts
owed to Mrs. York and her late husband on August 28 2000.
9) Mr. York passed away in July Of 2001.
10) The warehouse has an accessed property tax value of $130,000.
11) Betty York (an 81 year old widow) has attempted to sell the warehouse without success.
12) Mr. Gardiner filed suit against Interport and Betty York claiming that the transfer of the
warehouse to Mrs. York was a fraudulent transfer under U.C.A 25-6-5.
13) After trial in which Mr. Gardiner was represented by Mr. Slavins and Mrs. York
represented herself, the Court found in favor of Mr. Gardiner and found that the there was
a fraudulent transfer under U.C.A. 25-6-5(1 )(a) and granted to Mr. Gardiner a lien on the
that property under U.C.A. 25-6-9(2)(b).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of fraudulent transfer under U.C.A
25-6-5 and there was ample evidence to support a finding that there was pre-existing debt to Mrs.
York which the Court simply ignored.

ARGUMENT
For clarity in this document counsel will refer to Mr. York (President of Interport) as Mr.
York and to Mr. York's Father (who is deceased) as Senior Mr. York.
The requirements of a finding of fraudulent transfer under U.C.A. 25-6-5 break down as
follows:
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Thefirstleg is defined by U.C.A 25-6-5(l)(a). This is the "actual intent leg". Under this
subsection a transfer is fraudulent if the transfer was made
"with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor"
The factors to consider wften determining if there was "actual intent" are listed in subsection
U.C.A 25-6-5(2) and are as follows:
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (1) (a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after
the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation
incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was
incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
The second leg of the statutory test is found in U.C.A 25-6-5(1 )(b) [the equivalent
value leg] which states:
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
or obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction
for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed
that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
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The fulfilling of either of these legs (l)(a) [actual intent] or (l)(b) [equivalent value]
is sufficient to constitute a fraudulent transfer. We will consider the second leg [equivalent
value] first since it can bb dealt with quickly. One of the conditions of Subsections (i) and (ii)
must be combined with the requirements of subsection (b) in order for a fraudulent transfer to
have occurred.
The Court ruled in paragraph 3 of its "Orders of the Court" in the document "Findings
and Order" that Interport "did not receive reasonable equivalent value in exchange causing
Interport to incur debt beyond its ability to pay." This seems to be a reference to a finding of
a fraudulent transfer under U.C.A 25-6-5(1 )(b). However this is a complete misinterpretation
of subsection (ii). Subsection (ii) refers to debt that would be incurred subsequent to the
transfer, not preceding it. The language is clear.
"(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he
would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due"
This subsection refers to future debts. The section talks of debt that he "would incur" or
"intended to incur" not to debts that he had incurred. There was no testimony or evidence
whatsoever presented at trial which showed that Interport was about to or intended to incur
debts beyond its ability to pay as they became due. Subsection (ii) fails for lack of proof.
With both subsections (i) and (ii) failing due to lack of proof, the leg represented by
U.C.A 25-6-5(1 )(b) [equivalent value] will fail as well since one of (i) or (ii) is required to
prove a fraudulent transfer under U.C.A 25-6-5(1 )(b) [equivalent value].
With U.C.A 25-6-5(1 )(b) [equivalent value] disposed of we will turn our attention to
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U.C.A. 25-6-5(l)(a) [actual intent]. The Court drew conclusions in paragraph 2 of the
"Orders of the Court" in the document "Findings and Order" which states:
"Actual intent was established for the following reasons: 1) the transfer was to
the (sic) Interport's President's parents, William and Betty York who were
insiders; 2) Interport and its president, Mr. York, retained possession and use of
the warehouse; 3) the transfer was made after Mr. York had notice of the
pending lawsuit;4) the transfer was made of the company's only asset of value; 5)
Mr. York's parents did not provide value for the asset."
None of these conclusions is justified or supported by anything placed in evidence.
We will deal with each of these reasons seriatim:
First, there is the question of whether Mr. York's parents were insiders. There is no
evidence that either Senior Mr. York or Mrs. York were officers or stockholders of the
corporation or that they had any inside position at all relative to the corporation. They are
being assigned the role of insider solely for the reason that they were the parents of one of the
officers of the corporation. There was no evidence presented on the nature of the corporation
and the status of other officers and/or stockholders. The nature of Interport is simply not
addressed. There is no presumption that I am aware of that the parents of a corporation or his
children, uncles, aunts, cousins, high school best friend or otherwise is an insider. It would
certainly be absurd to indicate that the parents of the President of General Electric is an
insider simply due to his relationship with one of its officers. It might make more sense if
Interport was a very closely held corporation, but such evidence was not presented. Without
more evidence than was presented at this trial a conclusion that the parents of a corporate
officer are insiders is unwarranted by case law or statute.
Second, is the assertion that Interport and its president, Mr. York, retained possession
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and use of the warehouse. This conclusion is directly contradiction by the testimony of the
only witness to deal with it. The testimony came from Mr. York the former President of
Interport. Beginning on page 35 of the transcript at the bottom of the page the testimony
reads:
Q. And Interport still had some of its stuff in the warehouse as well, correct?
A. Well there - 1 don't know about Interport. I can't remember what date that was.
Q. Well, if it wasn't Interport, it's because Interport wasn't a functioning company
anymore; is that a fair statement?
A. Yes, pretty much.
Q. It's still being used for storage?
A. Yes.
As far as counsel can find in the transcript, the above testimony is the sum total of all the
evidence presented relative to storage and control of the warehouse. Not only is there no
testimony that Interport is not storing anything there, there is testimony that Interport is or
was no longer functioning as an entity. There is therefore no way that Interport could
exercise control over the warehouse since it had ceased to exist. The conclusion giveni the
Findings and Order therefore has absolutely no basis in the evidence that was presented at
trial. That conclusion is completely unsupported and indeed is contradicted by the only
pertinent testimony taken.
Third, we turn to the conclusion that the transfer was made after Mr. York had notice
of the pending lawsuit. The conclusion that Mr. York was aware of the lawsuit filed by Mr.
Gardiner requires a leap of faith. The process of the original suit filed in Virginia was
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appropriately served on 18 August 2000 according to the record. However, the date upon
which Mr. York received actual notice by it's agent of the existence of the lawsuit is never
placed in evidence. Though Mr. York was on the stand, he was never asked if he was aware
of the lawsuit filed prior ito the transfer. Likewise there is no evidence presented from
Interport's agent that indicates when actual notice was sent or received by Mr. York. So, one
must make a leap of faith. One must assume that the Interport's agent communicated the
existence of the lawsuit to Mr. York. Such a leap of faith is improper in a court of law where
facts are to be proven, not assumed or found by faith.
Fourth, the court states that the transfer was made of the company's only asset of
value. There was no such evidence presented. There was only a brief mention of what assets
Interport had and that from an unqualified source. On page 20 line 13 the witness is the
plaintiff, Mr. Gardiner:
Q. What happened - did we find out if there was (sic) any assets that Interport holds?
A. Well, my understanding was that the only assets that Interport had was (sic) this
warehouse.
Q. That was from the discovery process?
A. Yes, sir.
The above testimony is the sum total of evidence presented on this point. However,
hearsay evidence from an unqualified source is not evidence at all. Rather than submit the
discovery received and qualify the documents and have them admitted, a simple summation
was made by a witness unqualified to discuss Interport's assets. Further the time of the
movement or existence of Interport's assets is critical. The transfer of the asset must make the
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debtor insolvent at or shortly after the time that the transfer occurred U.C.A. 25-6-5(2)(i).
There was no evidence presented or testimony given indicating the state of Interport after the
transfer of the warehouse. Was there substantial cash in the bank or goods? Were they
transferred or converted to cash? Was any cash transferred as salary or dividends. We simply
do not know. There is no evidence which delineates the financial condition of Interport and
thus the conclusion of the Court is completely without foundation or basis in fact or evidence.
Fifth is the Court's determination that Mr. York did not provide value for the asset.
This is clearly disproved by the evidence. Mr. York in his testimony repeated stated that
money was owed to Senior Mr. York and Mrs. York due to various business transactions. He
repeatedly refers to payments made to Senior Mr. York and Mrs. York for the various loans
that had been made. See page 30 lines 23-25 and page 31 lines 1 and 2 of the transcript of
trial. Paradoxically, the plaintiff in trying to disprove the existence of such a loan provided
additional proof of its existence. On page 24 of the transcript the Court presents exhibit 12
which is a copy of the Senior Mr. York and Mrs. York form 1505 from their year 200 tax
return. The exhibit was later admitted. That tax return shows two loans that the Senior York's
were attempting write off as bad debts. Page 25 lines 12 through 17 refer to two different
loans from Interport of $23,432 and $4,000. The position of the plaintiff was apparently that
writing off a loan with the IRS eliminates it from existence. While the IRS certainly has a
great deal of power as yet it has not been given the power to absolve one part of debt owed to
another. Even after a debt is written off, on a tax form, I can still be collected from the
debtor. Thus the tax return, far from disproving the existence of the loans, further proves it's
existence. In a comic twist, which perhaps only a trial attorney would find humorous, during
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the trial Mrs. York actually objected to the introduction of the tax return which was admitted
over her objection. While the asset is valued at $130,000 for purposes of taxation there is also
testimony that the property is white elephant. (Se page 33 line 22 of the transcript of the trial) It
has been on the marketfofryears and shows sign of moving. Handing over a white elephant
appraised at $130,000 in exchange for a $50,000 loan could easily been construed as an
equivalent exchange. While $50,000 will gain interest over time, a white elephant building will
only require the payment of property taxes and maintenance fees. Such an exchange would not be
anyone's idea of a fair trade.
CONCLUSION
The decision by the court was unsubstantiated by the facts or is contrary to statute. The
assertion that there was no evidence to substantiate the debt is contradicted by the evidence. Two
witnesses and a number of documents were introduced which proved that there was a preexisting and longstanding debt. The decision by the Court should be reverse and ruled in fabvor
of the appellant/defendant that there was no fraudulent transfer as defined in U.C.A. 25-6-5.
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JAMES K. SLAVENS (6138)
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 752
Fillmore, Utah 84631

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, FILLMORE COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD GARDINER
Plaintiff
vs.

:

FINDINGS AND ORDER

:

Case No. 016700050
INTERPORT, INC.; BETTY YORK
Defendant

:

JUDGE EYRE

THE MATTER, having come before the Court based upon the Plaintiffs Motion for Relief,
with the Plaintiff appearing with counsel of record, James K. Slavens, and Betty York appearing pro
se. The Court having heard testimony and upon reviewing the file, now makes the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff in this matter filed an action for judgment against the above referenced Defendant,
Interport, Inc. ("Interport'*) in the General District Court of Fairfax County, State of Virginia
and mailed a Warrant in Debt on or about August 2,2000 to Interport's registered agent which
was delivered to the registered agent on or about August 5,2000. The Warrant in Debt was
also served by private process server on the registered agent on August 18,2000.

2.

The Plaintiff in this matter obtained a judgment against Interport, Inc. in the General District
Court of Fairfax County, State of Virginia on January 3,2001, in the amount of $7,182.95,

plus interest, and costs in the amount of $37.00 as of January 3, 2001. Interest on said
judgment is accruing at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum thereafter.
3.

William York was the President of Interport and had notice of the lawsuit at least by August 6,
2000.

4.

The only asset of any value that Interport owned at the time was a warehouse ("warehouse")
located in Delta, Utah. The legal description of the warehouse is as follows:
Beginning at a point 404.52 feet South and 182.01 feet from the Wesi quarter corner of
Section 6, Township 17 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South 60
Degrees 09'49" East 290.43 feet; thence South 29 Degrees 32' West 324 feet; thence North
60 Degrees 09'49" West 240.53 feet; thence North 21 Degrees 34'Or West 64.12 feet to a
point 50 feet perpendicular to the East line of the Railroad right of way; thence North 29
Degrees 32' East 284 feet paralleling the East line of the Railroad right of way to the point of
beginning.
Subject to a Right of Way for a County Road, and incidental purposes as now exists.

5.

Interport, by William York transferred the warehouse to his mother and father on August 28,
2000.

6.

This foreign judgment was filed with this Court on May 7, 2001.

7.

William York's father passed away in July of 2001.

8.

Interport continued to use the warehouse for its purposes and was its only place of business in
use.

9.

Mr. York is attempting to sell the warehouse for $360,000.00, and it has a property tax value
of$130,000.00

10.

Betty York did not present any evidence thjat Interport owed her or her husband any money.
ORDERS OF THE COURT

1.

That pursuant to Utah Code Section 25-6-5, Interport's transfer of the warehouse to his father
and mother (Betty York) was fraudulent in that it was made with the intent to hinder, delay or

defraud its creditor, the Plaintiff.
2.

Actual intent was established for the following reasons: 1) the transfer was to the Interport's
President's parents, William & Betty York, who were insiders; 2) Interport & its president, Mr.
York, retained possession and use of the warehouse; 3) the transfer was made after Mr. York
had notice of the pending lawsuit; 4) the transfer was made of the company's only asset of
value; 5) Mr. York's parents did not provide value for the asset.

3.

Furthermore, the transfer was fraudulent in that Interport did not receive "reasonably equivalent
value in exchange" for the warehouse causing Interport to incur debt beyond its ability to pay.

4.

That pursuant to Utah Code Section 25-6-9 (2) (b), the Plaintiff may have a judgment lien on
the property in the following amounts:
a.

$7,219.95;

b.

Interest from January 3. 2001 at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum
thereafter for a total, as of September 1, 2005, of $3,094.22;

c.

5.

Costs associated in this matter as follows:
i.

Filing fee: $25.00

ij.

Deposition costs: $ 391.65

iii.

Service fee: $33.00

iv.

Total: $ 449.65

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 25-6-8 (2), the Plaintiff may levy execution on the
property and conduct a sale pursuant to law.
Dated this

day of August, 2005.
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